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Fate and Free Will: A Defense of Theological Determinism, by Heath White.
University of Notre Dame Press, 2019. Pp. vii + 396. $65.00 (hardcover).

DAVID P. HUNT, Whittier College
The constellation of issues addressed in this stimulating book—human
freedom; the problem of evil; divine foreknowledge, providence and sovereignty—has attracted an enormous amount of attention from Christian
philosophers. Unsurprisingly, no consensus has emerged, so new treatments of these issues are always welcome. And since most contemporary
philosophers (myself included) have approached the problem with a libertarian understanding of free agency, monographs that challenge this understanding are of especial interest.
White’s book is a defense of Theological Determinism, or “TD.” (Despite
its title, fate is hardly mentioned in the book, and then only to forestall
possible confusion with determinism.) TD has to be taken seriously,
if only because it’s so well-situated in the theological tradition. White
doesn’t claim to provide a knock-down argument for TD. Rather, he aims
to persuade fellow philosophers that TD is competitive (despite the widespread assumption to the contrary), thereby “rais[ing] its status” in the
debate (12).
TD, as White defends it, is the thesis that facts about God’s will determine, and are explanatorily prior to, every other contingent fact (6). Under
TD, God exercises “primary causation” with respect to creation by bringing an entire 4-dimensional block into existence ex nihilo and “at once.”
Despite its explanatory priority, God’s creative decree does not override,
or “crowd out,” or in any way qualify the “secondary causation” at work
within the world. White asks his reader to consider the various causal
possibilities—combinations of determinism, indeterminism, even agent
causation, if that’s a coherent notion (23)—if God is left out of the picture.
He continues:
Whatever causal theory you believed in before, keep believing in it, and call
it “secondary.” Then just mentally add that God creates the whole thing in
one single act, and call that action “primary.” There is no conflict between
the two types of cause. (24)

Though the intramundane causal regime needn’t be deterministic, this is
still a TD world, because it was brought into existence in toto via divine
fiat, and every fact about it is determined by God’s will.
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Divine primary causation isn’t just explanatorily prior to any secondary causation that might obtain within the world; it’s a different kind and
order of causation altogether. That makes it pretty mysterious, perhaps
understandable only by analogy. White’s “preferred form of TD imagines
God as an author in relation to his characters” (20)—with the exception,
of course, that the characters God writes into existence are real rather than
fictional. While the story is determined in every detail by the author, it’s
up to the author whether events within the story are determined by other
events within the story, or occur completely at random. It’s also up to the
author whether the characters in the story are free or unfree.
Is it up to the divine author whether the world includes libertarian freedom? It’s worth contrasting White’s answer here with that of two other
theological determinists, Hugh McCann and Derk Pereboom. McCann
(who also relies heavily on the author analogy) is an incompatibilist about
free will and intramundane (naturalistic) determinism, but a compatibilist
about free will and theological determinism. He argues that if God authors
into existence a world in which the intramundane conditions for free
will are satisfied, they are satisfied full stop: God’s authoring this world
changes nothing. For McCann, then, it is up to the divine author whether
the world includes libertarian freedom. Pereboom, on the other hand, is
an incompatibilist about both naturalistic and theological determinism,
so he would deny that the TD God has the option of creating a world
with libertarian (or any genuine) free agency. (He also holds, on empirical
grounds, that naturalistic determinism is almost certainly true—so there’s
no free will, even before God is added to the picture.)
White is a thoroughgoing compatibilist. The TD God can actualize a
storyline featuring agents with genuine free will (pace Pereboom), but this
free will cannot be libertarian (pace McCann). There are two strands making up libertarian freedom: the alternatives condition,
PAP: S does A freely only if, given all the facts not in S’s control, it is possible
for S to do otherwise than A,

and the source condition,
SRC: S does A freely only if there are no sufficient conditions for S doing
A such that S has no control over whether those conditions obtain. (8)

While there seem to be possible worlds satisfying both of these conditions,
God’s creating such a world would violate these conditions (given the TD
account of creation), because facts about God’s will, not under S’s control,
would be sufficient for S’s doing A, and preclude S’s doing other than
A. So TD does not allow for libertarian free will.
White’s touchstone for assessing the TD thesis is a “traditional, orthodox” theism involving six elements: omnipotence, omniscience, perfect
goodness (moral perfection), creation ex nihilo, atemporal eternity, and
a “robust Christian eschatology” of heaven and hell (10–11). His claim
is that TD offers a more straightforward account of these elements than
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its libertarian competitors: Open Theism, Simple Foreknowledge, and
Molinism.
It’s foreknowledge that’s supposed to give the TD God his advantage
when it comes to omniscience. The Openist God, to whom future contingents are unavailable, foreknows less than the TD God. As for Simple
Foreknowledge and Molinism, TD’s advantage lies in its forthright explanation of how God knows the future: by knowing his own comprehensive
will. Molinists explain divine foreknowledge as an inference from middle
knowledge, but this just pushes the mystery of divine foreknowledge back
onto the mystery of how God comes by his knowledge of counterfactuals
of creaturely freedom. White allows, in the case of Simple Foreknowledge,
that an atemporally eternal God could know what is to us future by “seeing” it à la Boethius; but the problem with this explanation is that divine
foreknowledge is then post-volitional, limiting its providential utility.
(Responding to arguments I’ve offered in a number of places, White grants
that simple foreknowledge might not be altogether useless.) It’s unclear,
however, why TD’s advantage here should be credited to omniscience,
since the TD God’s foreknowledge is also post-volitional.
Omnipotence is another attribute alleged to give TD an advantage.
White’s “simple view of omnipotence” is that an agent is omnipotent =df.
the agent can bring about any contingent state of affairs (51). Given this
definition, the non-TD God, whose creative repertoire includes worlds
with libertarian freedom, will be saddled with omnipotence-defeaters:
contingent states of affairs, like Jones’s scratching his ear of his own libertarian free will, that God cannot bring about, because his doing so would
violate their libertarian credentials. White concludes that
TD has on its side considerations of scope. . .[T]he “number” of states of
affairs [the non-TD God] can bring about. . .is considerably fewer than the
range of God’s power according to TD. As long as there are libertarian-free
creatures, there will be possible worlds, that is contingent states of affairs,
that God cannot bring about. (52)

Libertarian theists, of course, recognize this limitation on divine omnipotence (cf. Plantinga’s distinction between God’s strongly and weakly
actualizing a world). What’s unclear is whether this really gives a scope
advantage to TD omnipotence. The non-TD God—who can create all the
worlds the TD God can create—faces this limitation only because he chose
to create a libertarian world. If the TD God can create a libertarian world,
he will face the same limitations on his omnipotence—and if he can’t, then
for that very reason the scope of his omnipotence is arguably less than that
of the non-TD God.
Of course, given TD, a libertarian world isn’t even among the possibilia
available to divine omnipotence. But this appeal to TD would be circular
in the present context since White is citing omnipotence to argue for TD.
It’s actually another item on his list of traditional affirmations, creation
ex nihilo, that fills the gap. That’s because White endorses the Creation

382

Faith and Philosophy

Principle: “If God creates x out of nothing, the facts about God’s will
determine all the facts about x” (60). White defends this principle against
arguments for the coherence of vague, or disjunctive, or indeterministic
creative decrees. Readers can determine whether they find these arguments persuasive.
If not, White could simply add divine sovereignty to his list of traditional, orthodox touchstones, because this is where TD’s real advantage
over its libertarian rivals lies. The Open Theist God is a major risk-taker;
the God of Simple Foreknowledge can arguably mitigate risk, but cannot eliminate it; the Molinist God avoids risk altogether, but his creative
options are limited by the brute pre-volitional facts about which counterfactuals of freedom are true. Only the TD God can get exactly the world
he wants. As White notes at the end of his book, TD’s “greatest asset is the
especially robust sort of divine providence it underwrites” (345).
To secure this asset, White must reckon with TD’s two signal liabilities.
One is the challenge TD poses to creaturely freedom, moral responsibility, and the meaningfulness of life itself. This is a serious liability for an
incompatibilist like Pereboom. But White thinks that all these goods—the
genuine articles, not near-substitutes for them—are available under TD,
and the middle chapters of the book, amounting to fully half its length, are
devoted to a defense of compatibilism.
When it comes to responsibility, the most fundamental notion for White
is holding responsible. This is in contrast with the idea that the most fundamental notion is being responsible, which is then used as the standard for
determining whether it’s appropriate to hold responsible. Punishment is
the predominant way we hold people responsible, and White begins his
argument for compatibilism with punishment. “The basic logical structure of punishment and moral blame is the same, I believe, but it is easier
to see if we focus on punishment” (78).
The main incompatibilist challenge he must meet “is that the sort of
punishment our societies dish out can be justified only if people (really,
truly, deeply, ultimately) deserve it” (79). White rejects this “basic desert”
requirement in favor of a forward-looking “social maintenance” theory
of punishment, justified by its protecting and promoting various social
goods. Practices like incapacitation and deterrence, established to secure
these goods, lose nothing of their value if determinism is true.
The justification of such practices lies in how well they perform their
function. There are other arenas in which we assess people’s performances
and hold them accountable for failing to meet certain standards: admissions exams, professional certifications, employee reviews, marksmanship
tests, etc. Given the purposes of these assessments, a poor performance is
excusable if the assessment instrument doesn’t accurately measure what
it’s supposed to measure (because the test is misprinted, the test-taker has
kidney stones, etc.). But if excusing conditions like these aren’t present,
and the person being evaluated really does lack the competencies being
evaluated, it doesn’t matter how or why the person came to lack those
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competencies. “My contention is that holding each other morally responsible is a practice with exactly the same structure. . .In such cases, the inevitability of moral failure [as entailed by TD] is no excuse” (156).
At the end of the day, “[b]lameworthiness is a matter of quality of will,
and it does not really matter what the source of that poor quality is” (179).
In the case of Robert Alton Harris, who killed two boys to use their car
in a bank robbery, laughed about it, showed no remorse, etc., if we find
out that
he had an abusive family, was brutalized on numerous occasions, and lacked
any positive examples—even if we add that Harris had no responsibility
for these facts and that God caused them all—we still learn all we need to
know about Harris’s character and reason. . .In this case, judging Harris to
be blameworthy for his actions is not at all undermined by the claim that
those actions, or their causes, were brought about by God. (187)

(White comments: “Perhaps this makes me a mild revisionist about moral
responsibility” (196)!) Everyone knows that moral luck plays a role in how
people turn out, and we don’t really care, in the sense that this doesn’t
alter the moral judgments we make. But White recognizes that this “marks
a stark divide in thinking about free will and moral responsibility” (247).
The other liability accompanying TD is the challenge posed by evil. The
more impressive God’s creative and providential resources, the more puzzling the existence and extent of the evils to be found in creation. White
devotes three chapters to this problem, including its extension into the
afterlife. He doesn’t aim to solve the problems of evil and of hell, but “to
show that TD does no worse than extant theistic alternatives in addressing
the problem of evil in its various guises” (251).
The Free Will Defense challenges the metaphysical premise of Mackie’s
famous argument for the logical problem of evil: that “an omnipotent,
omniscient being can see to it that there is no evil.” White reviews some
of this defense’s well-known limitations. A more favorable target for TD
is the argument’s moral premise, that “a good thing always eliminates
evil as far as it can” (252). White notes that there is quite a “deep bench”
of responses to this premise, and he reviews a number of these, including
the Greater Good Theodicy, the Natural Order Theodicy, the Soul-Making
Theodicy, the O Felix Culpa Theodicy, and the God Owes Us Nothing
Theodicy (253–259). All of them can be deployed by TD as well as by
libertarian theism.
The problem of gratuitous evil picks up where the problem of the mere
existence of evil leaves off. The skeptical theist’s response—that we’re not
in an epistemic position to judge with confidence whether an evil is gratuitous—is just as available to the TD-defender as it is to the libertarian.
As for horrendous evils, TD is no less entitled than libertarian theism to
invoke Marilyn Adams’s proposal “that God will ensure that our lives will
be great goods to us in the end” (278).
TD, however, faces an “Is God the author of evil?” problem in a way
that libertarian theism does not. White distinguishes here between the
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claim that the TD God causes evil and the claim that he intends evil. He
invokes Augustine’s privative notion of evil to escape the first. Even if
God does not cause evil, in this sense, he is nevertheless responsible for
there being evil, and for there being these evils. (The cheesemaker might
not cause the holes in the Swiss cheese, but still is responsible for its having those holes.) When it comes to this second problem, however, White
argues that God doesn’t intend everything for which he’s responsible, and
he’s blameworthy only for what he intends. The TD God, while determining everything that happens, does not intend all of it.
Inseparable from the problem of evil, and “[t]he steepest challenge for
TD. . .is the doctrine of hell” (307). Given that White’s aim is only to make
TD competitive with the libertarian alternatives, the seriousness of this
problem (if universalism is taken off the table) actually makes White’s job
easier: if it’s difficult to say what morally sufficient reasons the TD God
might have for “creating a populated hell, it is no easier to say what reasons
the libertarian’s God might have” (313). Whatever those reasons might be,
why think they wouldn’t work for the TD as well as the non-TD God?
An important attack on hell’s fairness appeals to two principles: the
Egalitarian Principle,
EP: God’s perfect love must be maximally extended and equally intense,

and the No Unequal Blessings Thesis,
NUB: If God loves A and B equally, God will not bless A more than B.

White’s answer is that the TD God’s plan for creation might consist of
myriad roles that need to be filled: “Someone has to fill the role of Mother
Teresa. . .but someone else has to fill the role of Judas” (322). This is a troublesome answer if one thinks “that God should not have created a world
where some individuals are damned if he could have created a world
in which they would not be damned in other circumstances.” White’s
response: “I confess that the moral principle underlying the objection
eludes me” (335).
There are some hard doctrines here. White writes that when he began
the book, he would have classified himself as a “traditional, orthodox
Christian,” but that he ended as “a hopeful or wishful agnostic.” He adds
that the reasons were “mostly remote from the issues in this book” (11–12),
but one can easily imagine a scenario in which they weren’t at all remote.
His concluding section on hell is titled, “Maybe It’s Not About Us.”
I found myself resisting many of White’s judgments. While it’s certainly not “all about us,” it might nevertheless seem that we are ends in
a more robust way than White’s TD allows. It’s hard to see how “social
maintenance” can do justice to the practice of holding ourselves responsible, and as someone whose nightstand always hosts Augustine’s
Confessions, this seems the fundamental practice. Etcetera. Nevertheless, it’s
not as though there is a completely satisfactory non-TD solution to the
problems addressed in this book. When White writes that “[a] theological
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determinist will. . .have to affirm that the goodness of God is stranger to
our eyes than one might naively think” (337), I don’t think that anyone
who has spent any time thinking about these things can say, with any confidence, that this won’t ultimately be true of their own position.
I’ve barely scratched the surface of this rich book. It’s clearly written and organized, fairly and accurately presenting opposing positions
(including my own), provocatively challenging libertarian presumptions.
Despite my many disagreements with White—better, because of those disagreements—I think it is essential reading for anyone interested in the
problem of how best to harmonize providence, evil, and free will.

The War that Never Was: Evolution and Christian Theology, by Kenneth W.
Kemp. Cascade Books, 2020. Pp. 228. $28.00 (paperback).
CHERYL KAYAHARA-BASS, Independent Scholar
When I received this book for review, it was with some trepidation that
The War That Never Was would be another conventional effort to reconcile
the biblical account of creation with one or more of the various evolutionary theories that have followed Darwin’s Origin of the Species (1859). Such
efforts, on both sides of this historical dialogue, are frequently rife with
partially understood ideas, disingenuous and twisted quotations of the
literature from both sides, and conclusions that often bear far too close
a resemblance to their initial hypotheses. However, what I found was a
unique project that crossed the lines of several disciplines, in the following manner.
Dr. Kenneth Kemp is a Roman Catholic philosopher, and within the
introduction of The War That Never Was, he makes clear his own position
on the twofold matters at hand, as he identifies with the view expressed
by Thomas Dobzhansky, a synthesizer of Darwinism and Mendelism,
that he is “a creationist and an evolutionist” (23), and holds that, “Like
Dobzansky, I believe that God created out of nothing a world that slowly
changes over the course of time in accordance with the laws of nature
which he established. I believe that scientists have given a generally
accurate account of the age of the world and of the processes which have
effected its change over time” (23).
However, it is not as a philosopher that Dr. Kemp sets up his present project. He makes clear from the beginning that his intention is to
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